Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 3

Article 7

7-1-1997

Subrogation of Personal Injury Claims: Toward Ending an
Inequitable Practice
Keith E. Edeus Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Keith E. Edeus, Jr., Comment, Subrogation of Personal Injury Claims: Toward Ending an Inequitable
Practice, 17 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 509 (1997).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Subrogation of Personal Injury Claims:

Toward Ending an Inequitable Practice
INTRODUCTION

Each year, thousands of Americans submit claims to their insurance
companies to recover for injuries and illnesses sustained as a result of the
1
negligence or recklessness of others. Tragically, because of insurance
limitations and frequently judgment-proof defendants, many of these people
achieve little or no relief. Still others achieve some level of satisfaction
only to watch as much of their award is consumed by the costs of protracted
litigation. With this in mind, this comment addresses the validity and
2
propriety of insurance policy provisions which subrogate an insurer to the
3
personal injury claims of its insured.

I. PREFATORY EXAMPLE 4
In March of 1988, Billy, an eighteen year old, was injured while riding
as a passenger on a motorcycle. As a result, Billy was declared a permanently disabled adult. Fortunately, Billy was the beneficiary of a health and
1. In 1995, for example, over three million people were injured and thirty-five
thousand were killed on America's highways alone. Fifteen hundred of these deaths occurred
in Illinois. American Automobile Manufacturers Association, AAMA Motor Vehicle Facts
& Figures, 92-93 (1996).
2. Subrogation has been defined as:
the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful
claim, demand or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the
other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities.
Subrogation denotes the exchange of a third person who has paid a debt in the
place of the creditor to whom he has paid it, so that he may exercise against the
Black's
debtor all the rights which the creditor, if unpaid, might have done ....
Law Dictionary 1427 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
3. For an excellent article identifying various problems associatedwith the extension
of subrogation to personal injury cases, and canvassing approaches by different jurisdictions
to address such problems, see Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora'sBox Awaiting
Closure,41 S.D. L. Rev. 237 (1996).
4. The following prefatory example is based upon In re Estate of Scott, 567 N.E.2d
605 (III. App. Ct. 1991). The example illustrates a common situation in which medical
payments made by the insurer of an injured, non-negligent insured give rise to a right of
subrogation. Note that this case deals with a self-funded plan. Subrogation itself is more
palatable in such situations because such plans are likely to include subrogation recoveries
in premium computations, unlike in 'standard insurance situations. See infra note 24 and
accompanying text.
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disability group plan provided by his father's employer, Sundstrand-Sauer.
Altogether, Sundstrand paid approximately $200,000 for Billy's injuries
pursuant to the plan, which contained a typical subrogation provision
entitling the insurer to be reimbursed out of any subsequent action taken by
Billy arising out of the accident in question. 5 This amount did not come
close to making the disabled young man whole, so his estate brought an
action against the motorist who had struck the motorcycle upon which Billy
was riding. That suit ended in a settlement for $121,000, the policy limit
of the negligent motorist. After paying litigation costs and attorney's fees,
Billy's estate was left with only $89,000 from the settlement.
Shortly thereafter, Sundstrand brought an action seeking to recover this
$89,000 pursuant to the subrogation provision in the plan, in spite of the
fact that Billy's actual damages were between three and five million dollars,
and the fact that the previously paid $200,000 was thus clearly inadequate.
Should Sundstrand be able to recover the $82,000?6 Another way of
asking the question is, "Who should bear the risk of non-recovery?" Should
concepts of public policy militate against allowing an insurer to recover its
payments and retain any premiums the insured had paid, while the insured
is not made whole? These are the fundamental questions which shall be
addressed in this article.
First, this article discusses the history of subrogation and its extention, in
most jurisdictions, to personal injury claims. It will then describe the
harshness that often results when subrogation is so applied, as well as the

5. The provisions read:
Subrogation, Assignment and Lien. On payments of benefits hereunder as a result
of Injury or Illness, the Fund shall be subrogated, to the extent of benefits made
or to be made under This Plan, to all the rights of a Covered Individual against any
person, firm or organization arising out of such Injury or Illness and the Covered
Individual shall execute and deliver instruments and documents and do whatever
is necessary to secure such rights to the Fund. The Covered Individual shall do
nothing to prejudice such rights. Each Covered Employee hereby assigns to the
Trustees of the Fund out of any amounts received or to be received by the Covered
Individual as a result of Injury or Illness for which the Covered Individual has a
claim against any person, firm or organization to the extent of benefits made or to
be made under This Plan. In addition, the Covered Individual hereby grants a lien

to the Trustees of the Fund out of any amounts received or to be received by the
Covered Individual as a result of Injury or Illness for which the Covered Individual
has a claim against any person, firm or organization to the extent of benefits made
or to be made under This Plan. Id. at 606.
6. The Scott court held in the affirmative, ordering all $82,000 be reimbursed to
Sundstrand. Id. Benefits from the suit against the negligent motorist therefore inured only

to Sundstrand and, of course, Billy's attorneys. Despite the inequity of the holding, the court

is right but for the wrong reason. See Id. at 851 (Reinhard, J., concurring) (noting ERISA
preemption of common law principles in employer funded insurance setting and citing FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990)).
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various approaches that different jurisdictions have adopted to ameliorate
such harshness. Special attention will be paid to the approach Illinois courts
have taken to protect insureds in such situations, which is essentially limited
7
to an inconsistent application of the "common fund doctrine." Finally, it
is proposed that the Illinois General Assembly or Supreme Court reject
subrogation in the personal injury context, or limit the applicability of
subrogation so that an insurer may only be reimbursed with any excess
recovery remaining after the insured is made whole, or at the very least
require that insurers provide and make insureds aware of alternative policies,
albeit at higher premium prices, which do not contain subrogation clauses.
II.

SUBROGATION

GENERALLY

The doctrine of subrogation stems from equity, and allows a secondarily
liable party who has paid a principal's debt to take advantage of any remedy
which the creditor originally held against the principal debtor in order to
reimburse such party. 8 Thus, in the insurance context, subrogation puts the
insurer in the shoes of the insured, to the extent that the insurer has made
payments, to pursue any parties that should in fact have been liable to the
insured regarding the loss paid by the insurer.9 Subrogation allows anyone
who pays for another's wrong to look to such other for reimbursement,
unless the payor is a mere volunteer.10 While it has been said that
subrogation creates a new right in the subrogee's favor, "the original right
(of the subrogor] measures the extent of the new right."'" Generally, the
applicability of the doctrine is said to rely upon "principles of natural
justice" and "dictates of equity and good conscience", rather than upon a
contract. 12 Since the law of insurance has grown out of the general
doctrine of suretyship, it may be helpful to think of a subrogee as a surety,
of creditor and may
who, after paying a principal's debt, assumes the role
13
principal.
the
by
payment
subsequent
force
seek to
7. This doctrine concerns who shall be responsible for attorney's fees and costs
incurred in subsequent actions against the true tortfeasor. See infra part III.
8. WILLIAM R. VANCE & BUIST M. ANDERSON, VANCE ON INSURANCE, § 134 (3d
ed. 1951).
9. GEORGE J. COUCH & RONALD A. ANDERSON, 16 COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-

ANCE LAW, §61:1 (Mark S. Rhodes ed., rev. 2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter 16 COUCH
CYCLOPEDIA).
10. Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Wis. 1976).
11. Id. (quoting 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 1265, at 844 (3d ed. 1967)).
12. 16 COUCH CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 9, § 61:20, at 96.
13. VANCE ON INSURANCE, supra note 8, § 134, at 787-88. Note that a "surety's right
of subrogation does not arise ordinarily until the debtor is paid in full. A partial payment of
the debt, even though it may be the full amount for which surety has bound himself, will not
entitle him to subrogation to the creditor's rights and securities." Garrity,253 N.W.2d at 514
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SHOULD SUBROGATION APPLY IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES?

The right to subrogation has-been held to arise from the common law, a

contract, or by virtue of statute. 14 Thus, commentators speak of a differ-

ence between legal or equitable subrogation on the one hand, and conventional or contractual subrogation on the other.1 5 Increasingly, insurers
have relied upon the latter, both to protect their rights under existing law
and to expand the law of subrogation to include application in new
areas. 16 One area in which insurance companies have sought to expand
the application of subrogation is that of "med-pay" policy provisions for
personal injuries suffered by the insured. Under the common law, the
doctrine was held not to allow subrogation of personal injury claims, 17 so
most jurisdictions initially refused to so extend the doctrine. More recently,
however, insurance companies have been quite successful in their efforts to
expand subiogation into the personal injury arena. 18 Should this be
allowed?
Several states answer this question in the negative. In doing so, courts,
particularly in earlier cases, have relied upon the common law prohibitions
against splitting a cause of action, 19 and against assigning personal injury

(citing 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §1269 (3d ed. 1967)). This analysis would seem to
suggest that an insured must be made whole before any excess money need be reimbursed
to the insurer. For an example, albeit a muddled one, of an Illinois court acknowledging this
principle and reaching such a result, see Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 262
N.E.2d 618 (I1. App. Ct. 1970); but cf.Scott, 567 N.E.2d at 607 (distinguishing Ross on
other grounds and reaching a contrary result without discussing the surety analysis).
14. Dworak v. Tempel, 161 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. 1959).
15. 16 COUCH CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 9, § 61:2-3, at 75-76. The distinction is only
rarely significant, such as where an express contract grants broader rights than the common
law of the state would otherwise provide. Id. While statutes may give rise to rights for
subrogation, the more common situation as far as this article is concerned is the limitation
or elimination of otherwise valid subrogation rights by statutes. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §
38.1-381.2 (1970)
No policy or contract of bodily injury or property damage liability insurance that
contains any representation by an insurer to pay all reasonable medical expenses
incurred for bodily injury caused by accident to the insured or any relative or other
person coming within the provisions of the policy, shall be issued or delivered by
any insurer licensed in this Commonwealth upon any motor vehicle then principally
garaged or principally used in this Commonwealth, if the insurer retains the right
of subrogation to recover amounts paid on behalf of an injured person under the
provision of the policy from any third party. Id.
16. Roger M. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims: The "Double
Recovery"Myth and the FeasibilityofAnti-SubrogationLaws, 96 DICK. L. REV. 581, 583
(1992).
17. See VANCE ON INSURANCE, see supranote 8, §134, at 796-97.

18. Baron, supra note 16, at 583.
19. See, e.g., Lowder v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 436 P.2d 654 (Okla.
1967).
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claims. 20 The latter prohibition is frequently cited by courts refusing to
extend subrogation. Reasons for the prohibition against assignment of
personal injury claims were cited by the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Berlinski v. Ovellette21 . These included: (1) to discourage "unscrupulous
interlopers" from purchasing pain and suffering claims and pursuing
remedies pursuant thereto, in a champertous fashion; (2) out of recognition
that personal injuries are by their nature too personal to be assigned; (3) out
of recognition that tortfeasors should not be held liable to persons that they
did not harm; (4) to reduce "excessive litigation"; and (5) out of recognition
that subrogation arrangements may prejudice the ability of the insured to
2 2 The court went on to
receive full compensation for his or her injuries.
for personal injury cannot be
state that for these reasons a cause of action
2 3contrary.
the
assigned absent a statute to
On the other hand, some states have rejected the common law prohibition
on various grounds. For example, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, after
pointing out the need for widely available hospitalization insurance, rejected
the prohibition against assignment of personal injury claims, as far as
subrogation is concerned, out of a hope of reducing insurance premium
rates. 4 Other courts have gotten around the problem by similarly holding
that the subrogation setting provides an exception to the assignment
prohibition, 25 or by conveniently holding that subrogation is not an
giving rise to some lesser right of
assignment at all, but merely a device
26
lien.
equitable
an
reimbursement, or
20. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. Ct.
1965).
21. 325 A.2d 239 (Conn. 1973).
22. Id. at 242.
23. Id. at 241 (citing 6 AM. JUR. 2d 220, Assignments, § 37).
24. Hospital Service Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 110 (R.I. 1967).
But see PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, 151-52 (2d ed. 1957) (stating
"subrogation is a windfall to the insurer. It plays no part in the rate schedules (or only a
minor one).").
25. See, e.g., Jacobson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 491 P.2d 168 (N.M. 1971).
26. See, e.g., Damhesel v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 209 N.E.2d 876 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1965) (holding that subrogated rights were not assigned). This conclusion was
necessary for the court to enforce the subrogation provision since Illinois still recognizes that
personal injury claims cannot be assigned. See, e.g., Putnam v. Continental Air Transp. Co.,
297 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1971); see also Town & Country Bank v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 459
N.E.2d 639 (Il1.App. Ct. 1984). Other stateshave expresslyrejected attempts to characterize
the subrogation of an insured's rights as anything other than an assignment, holding that an
assignment of a personal injury claim, by any other name, smells as bad. See, e.g., Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Druke, 576 P.2d 489, 492 (Ariz. 1978) (rejecting the argument that a mere
reimbursement right was created and stating that "[w]hatever the form, whatever the label,
whatever the theory, the result is the same."); see also Berlinski v. Ovellette, 325 A.2d 239,
242 (Conn. 1973) (the court rejected an argument that right of reimbursement stemmed from
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In recent years, new criticisms have emerged. These criticisms have been
based not upon alleged violations of common law precepts, but upon the
faulty reasoning upon which the doctrine of subrogation is based, and the
harsh consequences it often effectuates. 27 Subrogation is said to be founded upon the idea that it is proper to prevent an insured from achieving a
double recovery for his or her loss, one recovery being from the insured, the
other from the tortfeasor. 28 Arguably, this seems fair, but only in an ideal
situation. For example, if an insurer makes a $10,000 payment to its insured, an automobile accident victim, and this fully compensates the victim,
and the insurer subsequently brings an action against the tortfeasor pursuant
to the insurer's subrogation rights and in fact secures a judgment or settlement for $10,000, then all ends well. The insurer and the insured are both
made whole and the tortfeasor is out $10,000, the amount of loss caused by
that person.
The problem arises, however, where an insured's losses far exceed the
amounts that can be recovered from a tortfeasor plus what can be claimed
under medical payments provisions of the injured person's own insurance
policy.2 9 This is so because the insured's policy usually contains limits
and thus does not provide full indemnity, 30 or because the tortfeasor has
limited assets, insurance, or is otherwise judgment proof,3' or both. In
such situations, it has been held that "it violates public policy to allow an
the insurer
insurer to collect a premium for certain coverage and then allow
32
to subrogate its interest and deny the insured its benefits."
Thus, courts have held that even when there is a recovery beyond the
total loss, subrogation is not proper. This makes sense if one considers the
nature of insurance premiums. Insurance companies, based upon actuarial
statistics, essentially distribute the losses incurred by a few persons evenly
to a large number of persons who face similar risks. This is done by creating a fund through the collection of premiums from each member of this
large group of insureds. These premiums themselves are calculated based
a "trust agreement" rather than a prohibited assignment).
27. See, e.g., Baron, supranote 3, at 238-39. Baron actually calls into question any
situation in which an insurer is subrogated to the rights of its insured to proceed against the
party who caused the loss, whether such rights arise out of property damage or personal
injury loss. This article is sympathetic but deals solely with the personal injury context.
28. Id. See also 16 COUCH CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 9, § 61:18.

29. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
30. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 576 P.2d 489, 491 (Ariz. 1978).
31. Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 P.2d 812, 815 (Nev. 1986).
32. Id. at 815. The court went on to cite Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reitler, 628 P.2d 667,
670 (Mont. 1981) in stating that "precluding the subrogation of the insurer does not result
in a double recovery for the insured because the insured is merely receiving the benefits for
which he has already paid." See generally Baron, supra note 16.

1997]

SUBROGATION OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS

upon the losses actually incurred, adjusted, of course, to allow the company
to pay its costs and make a profit. What is important to note is that the premiums are based upon losses alone, and do not take subrogation recoveries
into account. 33 Thus, an insured is arguably paying for absolute indemnity, regardless of subsequent recoveries, but is receiving a limited, conditional indemnity, which is worth significantly less. Further, where the insured
is made whole through suit against or settlement with the tortfeasor, that
insured ends up in a worse position than an uninsured who is fully com34
pensated by the tortfeasor, since the insured has had to pay premiums.
An additional criticism was lodged by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. State Boardfor Property and Casualty
Rates,35 where the court stated that subrogation was inapplicable in the
personal injury context, because there "the exact loss is never totally capable
of ascertainment," and thus "the reasons militating against double recovery
do not obtain."'36 Inother words, since the insured's loss is not measured
by medical bills alone, but also includes pain and suffering and other
intangibles, 37 then even where the sum of payments received from the
insurer and funds obtained by way of settlement or judgment against the
tortfeasor exceed the total demonstrable loss (i.e., medical specials), it
cannot rightly be called a double recovery.
One final criticism concerns the role of the insured's attorney. The
subrogation agreement may require an attorney to simultaneously represent
both the client and the client's insurer while working for satisfaction against
the tortfeasor. Since the insurer's interest as to the amount and structure of
any recovery (settlement or judgment) will invariably differ in significant
the insured, the attorney may be subject to
ways from the interests of 38
problems.
interest
conflict of
33. See supra note 24.
34. Druke, 576 P.2d at 492 (Ariz. 1978) (the court stated that allowing an insurer to
subrogate itself to the personal injury claims of its insured after having charged the insured
premiums denied the insured "of his thrift and foresight.").
35. 637 P.2d,1251, 1255 (Okla. 1981) (the criticism was lodged in dicta, as the
outcome of the case was ultimately controlled by a statute expressly forbidding subrogation
to rights of injured persons pursuant to automobile insurance policies).
36. Id.
37. See Druke, 576 P.2d at 492, where the court stated:

[i]n addition to other 'out-of-pocket' losses, such as loss of income or earning

power and the costs of asserting said claim such as court costs and attorney's fees,
an accident victim often suffers non-economic losses such as physical pain and
mental anguish which are often not monetarily indemnifiable and never insurable.
Id.
38. See generally Thomas S. Brown & M. Jane Goode, Conflicts of Interest in
Subrogation Actions, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 16 (1986) (an article that addresses conflicts for

the benefit of the practitioner).
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The current state of the law in Illinois is clear. In spite of the fact that

Illinois maintains the common law prohibition against assigning personal
injury claims, the subrogation situation is held not to give rise to an assignment.3 9 An examination of the reasoning of several key decisions reveals
that the logic supporting this proposition is faulty. "Subrogation presupposes an actual payment and satisfaction of the debt or claim to which the
party is subrogated . . . [and] operates only to secure contribution and
indemnity.. ."4 This is often not the case. In an automobile accident,
there is a significant chance that the tortfeasor will have policy limits on his
liability insurance that are similar to the victim's, or that the tortfeasor is
underinsured or uninsured. Unless the tortfeasor is independently wealthy,
there will in such cases be no "actual payment and satisfaction of the debt",
and subrogation works an injustice on the injured party.
B. HOW SHOULD RECOVERIES BE DISTRIBUTED?
Even if subrogation should apply within the personal injury context, there
is still the question of how subsequent recoveries from tortfeasors should be
distributed. As noted by a number of commentators, there are essentially
five ways in which such recoveries may be apportioned: (1) by giving all
of the recovery to the insurer regardless of whether this exceeds the amount
of payments made by the insurer (this is the result of a true assignment of
the insured's rights); (2) by giving the insurer first priority to be compensated, up to the amount of payments previously made by the insurer, and then
giving any excess to the insured (insurer whole); (3) by giving the insured
priority, and only reimbursing the insurer out of money remaining when the
insured has been made whole (insured whole); (4) by refusing to apply
subrogation and allowing the insured to keep the entire recovery, even
where this recovery, when combined with payments already received from
the insurer, is in excess of the insured's loss; and (5) by apportioning the
recovery according to some proration, based upon the ratio of losses facing
the insured and insurer, respectively, or some other formula. 4 1 The real

39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Note that Illinois does allow the
assignment of choses of action, even where they arise from claims of a personal nature. 735
ILCS 5/2-403 (1993).
40. Damhesel, 209 N.E.2d at 878; see also Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 174

N.E.2d 7, 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
41. See Elaine M. Rinaldi, Apportionment of Recovery Between Insured and Insurer
in a SubrogationCase, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 803, 805-06 (1994) (CITING ROBERT E. KEETON,
BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW, § 3.10 (c)(2), at 160-62 (1971)). See also Baron, Supra
note 3, at 247-55.
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debate in the case law is between the "insurer whole" doctrine, number two
42
above, and the "insured whole" doctrine, number three above.
43
A majority of jurisdictions have adopted the "insured whole" doctrine.
The rationale behind this doctrine is that where either the insured or the
insurer must bear a loss due to the fault of some third party, the44 insurer
should bear the loss since it has been paid to assume such a risk. Cases
employing the "insured whole" doctrine frequently rely by way of analogy
in American
on the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court's decision
45
WestingIn
Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Co.
house, the principal was a contractor who, after completing his work
pursuant to a government contract, received ninety percent of his pay, but
subsequently failed to pay his suppliers and sub-contractors. These "creditors" made demands upon the contractor's surety, who consequently paid a
sum into court to the extent of its legal obligation, but this sum was
insufficient to fully pay all of the creditors owed. Later, the ten percent
which had not been paid to the contractor became available for distribution,
and the creditors and surety brought conflicting claims for such money, each
claiming priority. The Court held that the creditors' rights to have their
debts paid had priority over the surety's right to reimbursement. In so
holding, the Court stated, "[a] surety who has undertaken to pay the
creditors of the principal, thcugh not beyond a stated limit, may not share
in the assets of the principal by reason of such payment until the debts thus
'46 Judges and commentators
partially protected have been satisfied in full.'
47
insurance setting.
the
in
applies
reasoning
this
that
concluded
alike have
42. See Rinaldi, supra note 41, at 806 & n.15. The "insured whole" doctrine is the
practical result in jurisdictions where the subrogation of personal injury claims, whether
pursuant to legal or contractual subrogation, is prohibited. See, e.g., Druke, 576 P.2d 489.
43. Rinaldi, supra note 41, at 807. Note that Rinaldi lists Illinois among the jurisdictions that have adopted this doctrine, and cites Ross, 262 N.E.2d 618, for that proposition.
While Ross supports this contention, later Illinois cases are inconsistent With that case. See,
e.g., Scott, 567 N.E.2d 605 (supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text); seealso Capitol Indem.
Corp. v. Strike Zone, S.S.B. & B., 646 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (the court, relying
upon Scott, allowed subrogation where the insured had not been made whole).
44. Skauge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 565 P.2d 628, 632 (Mont. 1977); see
also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. W. P. Rose Supply Co., 198 S.E.2d 482, 484 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1973); Garrity, 253 N.W.2d at 514.
45. 296 U.S. 133 (1935). This case concerns a contractor's surety, which stands in an
analogous position to the insurance company in an accident case, except that a surety has a
contractual relationship with the principal, whereas there is no such relationship between an
insurer and a third party tortfeasor.
46. Id. at 137.
47. See, e.g., VANCE ON INSURANCE, supra note 8, § 134, at 790, where it is stated
"the owner of the destroyed property is entitled to full indemnity and the doctrine of subrogation will not be applied in any case so as to deprive him of this right"; see also Garrity,253
N.W.2d at 514 (quoting 4 Williston on Contracts, § 1269, 1273 (3d ed. 1967) and stating that
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Other jurisalictions, however, have rejected this reasoning and have
adopted the "insurer whole" doctrine, at least where specific contractual
language calls for such a result. Perhaps the most frequently cited case in
favor of the "insurer whole" doctrine is Petersonv. Ohio FarmersInsurance
Co.48 In that case, Peterson, the insured, suffered a $17,000 loss due to
a fire at his farm which damaged certain buildings. He received $7,800
from his insurer. Peterson and the insurer then brought an action against the
tortfeasor, which resulted in an $11,000 verdict. A dispute as to how to
apportion this $11,000 gave rise to a second suit. The trial court awarded
Peterson enough to cover his entire loss, and gave the excess to the insurer
(the "insured whole" approach), but the appellate court reversed, reimbursing the insurer to the extent of the $7,800 payment, and giving Peterson
only the remainder. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court,
relying upon the language of the policy as well as the wording of a
"subrogation receipt", signed by the insured at the time the $7800 payment
was initially made, and stated that "[t]he assignee, being the owner of all the
insured's right of recovery, must have priority in payment out of the funds
recovered. ' 49
It is important to note that in Peterson, as in other "insurer whole" cases,
the key to whether or not that doctrine will be applied lies in the language
of the particular subrogation provision in question. Thus, a different result
may obtain where only legal subrogation is at issue. One commentator
applauded this distinction, suggesting that the important "insured whole"
cases had reached "untenable" results by improperly ignoring the nature of
the subrogation contracts before them and making their decisions as though
50
only legal subrogation was at issue.
At least one Illinois court has agreed. In Capitol Indemnity Corp. v.
Strike Zone, S.S.B. & B.,51 the court held that where a subrogation
agreement is valid and enforceable, then the terms of the agreement, not
equities or common law precepts, control the result.5 2 But other Illinois
the "surety's right of subrogation does not arise ordinarily until the debt is paid in full.").
48. 191 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio 1963).
49. Id. at 159. Thus the court distinguished its earlier holding in Newcomb v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 22 Ohio St. 382 (1872), which had stood for the "insured whole" principle.

The Petersoncourt essentially limited the Newcomb holding to cases involving legal subrogation. Peterson, 191 N.E.2d at 159. In this day of modem insurance contracts, such cases
will be few indeed.
50. Rinaldi, supra note 41, at 811.
51. 646 N.E.2d 310, 311-12 (11. App. Ct. 1995).
52. Id. This holding is curious in light of the fact that the opinion cited Village of
Crainville v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 410 N.E.2d 5, 7 (Ill.
1980) for the proposition that "[w]here
subrogation arises from contract, those rights will not be recognized where the debt on which
the right of subrogation is based has not been paid." Perhaps the court read "debt" in this
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53
cases addressing the question of who to "make whole" have divided.
The Illinois legislature, on the other hand, has adopted a clear public policy
goal of assisting accident victims in their efforts to be made whole, as
evidenced by laws mandating that every vehicle driven in the state carry
liability insurance protection, 54 and by requirhn all policies sold in the
5
state to contain uninsured motorist provisions. ' These statutes reveal a
legislative recognition that in the event that a loss must be borne by some
innocent party, it makes sense to place that loss with the party who can best
afford it, particularly where that party was paid to assume the risk of just
such a loss.

C. WHAT EFFECT SHOULD A CONTRACT HAVE?

Judicial decisions refusing to allow subrogation in the personal injury
context, and decisions adopting the "insured whole" doctrine are based upon
equity principles and notions of public policy. Also, any anti-subrogation
legislation would have a similar public policy basis. One powerful
argument against either is that parties should be able to contract freely, to
bargain for specific provisions and to pay accordingly, without unnecessary
meddling by the courts. Indeed, this is the main argument in support of the
"insurer whole" doctrine. 56 Thus one Illinois court, refusing to adopt an
"insured whole" position, stated that to do so would "upset the settled
expectations of the parties as reflected in the policy of insurance by
the contract
overlaying inapplicable equitable principles which contravene
57
parties."
the
between
terms and forge a new agreement
It is true that for a brief period in American jurisprudential history the
right to contract was held to be a Constitutionally fundamental right worthy
of substantive due process protections.58 Since that time, however, the Supreme Court has reversed its position, so that the economic substantive due

sentence to mean the limited debt owed by the insured under the policy in the first instance,
instead of the whole debt owed by the tortfeasor.
53. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
54. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-601 (a) (West 1993).
55. 215 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/143 (a) (West 1993).

56. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text. As such, "insurer whole" is probably a

misnomer, since the courts would likely construe insurance contracts literally whether the
provisions granted the insured's rights priority, or the insurer's rights. "Insurer whole" will

suffice, however, since insurance companies do the drafting of these agreements and it is

quite unlikely that they will ever be written to benefit the insured to the detriment of the
insurer.
57. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Strike Zone S.S.B. &B. Corp., 646 N.E.2d 310,312 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995).
58. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (the Court recognized a
Constitutionally protected right to contract while invalidating a law limiting the number of
hours employees in a bakery could work).
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process cases of the early part of this century are now vilified and
rejected. 5 9 Thus, the right to contract is not inviolate, and must give way

to concerns of public policy.
That is the state of the law under the Illinois Constitution as well. As
the Illinois Supreme Court said in Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v.
Smith:
While rights of contract are favored and protected there is
no principle of absolute freedom of contract. It is a
qualified right and the State may, in its legitimate exercise
of police power, pass laws which limit or affect the right
of contract so long as those regulations are reasonably
safety, morals or general
necessary to secure the health,
60
welfare of the community.
Because of this, the "right of contract" argument does not effectively
challenge the validity of anti-subrogation legislation passed pursuant to the
legitimate police power objective of protecting the health of citizens.
That is not to suggest that only the legislature may define public
policies which will void a contract. A court may of its own accord refuse
to enforce contracts which violate public policy, as that term is defined by
the common law of the jurisdiction. 61 For example, in Illinois a contract
exempting persons from liability for negligent conduct may be held void
where the transaction has a "semi-public" nature and there is a special social
relationship involved.62
Another point to keep in mind concerning the weight that should be
afforded these insurance agreements is the relative bargaining position of the
parties to the contract. While insurance companies hire teams of lawyers to
draft policies, the average policyholder is not sophisticated enough to define
"subrogation", much less identify how a subrogation provision will affect,
some future recovery that the insured might otherwise be entitled to. While
one might crassly respond that people should "read what they sign" and
"hire a lawyer," it should be kept in mind that this is an unrealistic
expectation under the circumstances, and at any rate the true disparity in
bargaining position is something that should be considered since the insurer
is asking for an equitable remedy.

59. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (the Court upheld a state law
fixing maximum employment agency fees).
60. 156 N.E.2d 587, 595 (Ill. 1959) (citing City of Chicago v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.
Co., 122 N.E.2d 553 (Il1. 1954)).
61. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 257 (1991).

62. See Checkley v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 100 N.E. 942, 943 (I11.1913).

1997]

SUBROGATION OFPERSONAL INJURY CLI.MS

Particularly distressing in this regard is the reliance in some cases on
"subrogation receipts,"6 3 which are agreements signed by the insured after
a loss has occurred and when a draft is cut by the insurer. It is clearly
unconscionable to enforce a contract under such circumstances. The insured
has recently suffered a loss, and probably incurred significant debts as a
result. These debts, if unpaid, invariably lead to letters from hospitals, or
perhaps the family physician, demanding payment, or later, angry letters
from collection agencies that refuse to understand or sympathize with the
insured's situation. It is troubling that in such circumstances insurers make
it seem as though the payments which they are otherwise legally obligated
to pay under the terms of the policy are conditional on the insured's signing
an additional promise to subrogate. These agreements at best magnify the
disparity of bargaining position, and at worst amount to contracts made
under duress. Either way, they should not be enforced.
ATToRNEY'S FEES, COSTS, AND THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE
In jurisdictions which allow insurers to subrogate themselves to the
personal injury claims of their insureds, an additional question arises
or
concerning who should pay the costs that arise in pursuing a settlement
whole"
"insured
the
In
loss.
the
judgment against the person who caused
context, the question is merely whether reimbursment of such costs is a
necessary component of making the insured whole. The Supreme Court of
64
Michigan has held in the affirmative, and this should not be a surprising
result in jurisdictions which focus on making the insured whole and placing
the risk of any loss on the insurer. On the other hand, the insurer may
successfully argue that litigation costs were not the sort of risk it had agreed
The question is raised here, but left unresolved for future
to accept.
65
study.
is addressed
In Illinois, however, the question of who pays such costs
66
Generally
doctrine.
fund
common
the
through the application of
an
allows
which
speaking, the fund doctrine is an equitable doctrine
individual who is responsible for generating or preserving a fund to be
67
compensated for his services from those who benefit from such a fund.
ll.

63. See, e~g., Peterson, 191 N.E.2d at 159.
64. Washtenaw Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Budd, 175 N.W. 231, 233 (Mich. 1919).
65. Bear in mind that this is only important in those cases where recovery from a
tortfeasor is enough to compensate the insured for personal injury damages but not enough
to additionally cover attorney's fees and other costs.
66. For an article discussing in greater detail the treatment of the fund doctrine in
Illinois, see Robert J. Thompson, The Common Fund Doctrine: An Uncommonly Used
Preceptin PersonalInjury Cases, 84 ILL. B.J. 570 (1996).
67. See 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 334 (1980).
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The doctrine is ultimately based upon the notion that to allow individuals
to benefit from such a fund without contributing to the costs of its creation
would be to allow unjust enrichment. 68 Some decisions refer to the
existence of a quasi-contract or fiduciary status between the benefactor and
the beneficiaries. 69 For our purposes, the practical effect of the doctrine
is to require an insurer to pay some part of the costs of pursuing the
tortfeasor, since the insurer stands to gain thereby.7°
The United States Supreme Court adopted the doctrine in Trustees v.
Greenough,71 where a man named Vose, a holder of bonds on the Florida
Railroad Company, brought suit on behalf of himself and the other
bondholders against the trustees of a fund which was pledged for the
payment of interest on the bonds and for payments of the principal. He
alleged that the trustees were wasting the fund. Terming Vose a "trustee in
relation to the common interest,"72 the Court held that Vose was entitled
to recover his "reasonable costs, counsel fees, charges, and expenses
"....
73
incurred in the fair prosecution of the suit
Three years later, the Court extended the doctrine to allow attorneys
themselves, as opposed to their clients, to bring an action to recover from
the fund, in spite of the fact that such attorneys had already been fully paid
under whatever contract they had with their clients. 74 The rationale for
68. Id.; See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881); McGee v. Oldham, 642

N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994).

69. See Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532 (the Court said that the benefactor "at least acted

the part of a trustee...").

This quasi-contract approach poses possible conflict of interest problems for an
attorney who cannot represent adverse interests. The Illinois Supreme Court has responded
that as far as the creation of the fund is concerned, the client and the other beneficiaries are
not adverse litigants in that they have the same common interest in creating the fund from
which they will both benefit. Baier v. State Farm Ins. Co., 361 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (I1.
1977). This response seems to ignore the fact that it is not necessarily the amount, but the
structure of the award that may be a point of contention between an insurer and its insured.

For example, an insured will seek to gain a settlement which pays more for the consortium
claims of a spouse, or more for pain and suffering, since such recoveries may not be subject
to subrogation.

70. Typically, the insurance company would be required to pay a contingent fee based

on the portion of the award that went to the insurer by way of subrogation. Thus, where the
company had made $6000 in med-payments, after which the insured successfully brought suit
against the tortfeasor without any assistance from the company, then the doctrine would allow
the insured's attorney to deduct attorney fees from the $6000 portion of the recovery that
would go to the company. Usually, this would be one-third, or in this case $2000. Other
methods besides contingency arrangements have been utilized. See Monique Lapointe, Note,

Attorney'sFeesin Common Fund Actions, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 843 (1991).
71. 105 U.S. 527.
72. Id. at 532.
73. Id. at 537-38.
74. Central R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
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allowing attorneys to bring the action is quite different from that for allowno loss
igclients to do so, since an attorney who is paid by a client suffers
commentator
one
least
At
that equity would normally seek to compensate.
"to
of an attorney
75
has criticized the decision as creating an indefensible right
strangers.
of
wealth
in the
an extra award so that he might share
Illinois cases have limited the applicability of the fund doctrine, at least
76
subrogain the personal injury context, to cases involving insurance
insured
the
tion.77 These cases require an "express agreement between
against a
and insurer, subrogating the insurer to any claim the insured had
applicathe
for
case
a
prove
to
third party ... "78 In order for a plaintiff
fund
the
that
(1)
bility of the fund doctrine, Illinois courts have required:
attorney;
was created "as a result of legal services" performed by plaintiff's
fund";
(2) that the insurer/subrogee "did not participate in the creation79of the
courts
The
fund."
the
and (3) that the insurer/subrogee "benefitted from
cauwith
used
have also "recognized that the fund doctrine should be
precluded where the
tion.''8° Further, the applicability of the doctrine is
recipient." 81
unwilling
an
for
rendered
knowingly
been
"have
services
the
These general rules form the basis of the law as applied throughout
state.
Much of the case law is dedicated to fleshing out this skeletal
of
paradigm, but the courts have not consistently approached one area
part of
inquiry in this regard: What sort of participation is needed on the
way,
another
asked
or
the subrogee to preclude application of the doctrine,
Illinois
The
how does a subrogee establish that it is an unwilling recipient?
Supreme Court has so far declined invitation to provide definitive standards
Funds, 87
75. John P. Dawson, Lawyers & InvoluntaryClients: Attorney Feesfrom
Hare. L. Rev. 1597, 1603 (1974).
actions. See
76. The fund doctrine is applied in other contexts, for instance, class
1384 (1971).
A.L.R.3d
38
Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Attorney'sFeesin ClassActions, N.E.2d 4 (IlI. App. Ct.
379
Chicago,
of
City
v.
Chtd.
Weinstein,
77. See Boehm and
medical
1978). The court held that where a plaintiff's employer held a lien for plaintiff's
of the
settlement
a
of
proceeds
the
of
out
paid
ultimately
was
lien
expenses, and where this
apply.
not
did
plaintiff's action against a tortfeasor, the fund doctrine
N.E.2d
See also Maynard v. Parker, 369 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (aff'd 387 had a
1979)), where the doctrine was not applied to a situation in which a hospital
298 (Ill.
out of funds
lien against a plaintiff's personal injury claim, and where the lien was satisfied
derived from a settlement of that claim. Id. at 355.
App. Ct. 1983).
78. Powell v. Inghram, 453 N.E.2d 1163, 66 (I!!.
v. Kujawa, 602N.E.2d 38,
accordPerez
198;
196,
N.E.2d
642
Oldham,
79. McGeev.
Co., 470 N.E.2d 6, 7 (Ill.
Ins.
Mut.
40 (111. App. Ct. 1992); Tenney v. American Family
App. Ct. 1980)).
(Ill.
953
949,
N.E.2d
400
Marzolf,
v.
Smith
App. Ct. 1984)(citing
80. Tenney, 470 N.E.2d at 8; see also Powell, 453 N.E.2d at 1166.
642
81. Pope v. Speiser, 130 N.E.2d 507 (Ill. 1955); see also Brase v. Loempker,
N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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in this regard.8 2 Instead, the courts have adopted a case-by-case approach. 83 The case that is invariably relied upon by insurance companies,
however, is Tenney v. American Family Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. 84 The opinion in Tenney suggests that an insurer needs to do little
beyond mailing a letter indicating that the insurer is an unwilling recipient
of the attorney's services to avoid any responsibility for fees and other
litigation costs incurred. This approach, however,' allows an insurer to sit
back and wait while the insured incurs significant expenses in pursuit of the
tortfeasor, only to demand payment once satisfaction against the tortfeasor
is achieved.
Other decisions have demanded more, however. 85 The case law is
not at all consistent in this area, but those cases which have required more
from the insurer have focused upon the timing of the letter in relation to the
filing of the suit, and the language of the letter itself.86 The timing of the
letter is arguably important, because prompt notification to the insured's
attorney that fees from the insurer will not be forthcoming, if received
before the attorney has incurred large expenses, may materially affect
litigation strategy. As to the language of the letter, however, this is mere
form over substance, and results in insurers stumbling about, looking for the
"magic words" that will preclude the doctrine.
At any rate, even where an insured can overcome the substantial
obstacles described above in order to see the fund doctrine applied, the
positive effect will in most cases be negligible. 87 Much of the benefit will
be absorbed by the attorney. 88 Additionally, since the insurers are aware
82. See Baier v. State Farm Ins. Co., 361 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (Ill. 1977), where the
Court rejected the invitation to set "appropriate guidelines" to govern fund doctrine cases as
this would "require the decision of questions not presented on this record.., which might
arise upon remand .... " The defendant, who extended the invitation, pointed to State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Geline, 179 N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1970), where the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had promulgated certain guidelines.
83. SeeBrase,642N.E.2d at 205; cf Perez,602N.E.2d at 41 ("under the circumstances of this case, as in Tenney, it would be equitable to apply the fund doctrine").
84. 470 N.E.2d 6 (11. App. Ct. 1984).
85. See, e.g., Powell, 453 N.E.2d at 1166 (a letter was held insufficient evidence of
unwilling recipiency).
86. See Perez, 602 N.E.2d at 41 (the doctrine was not applied where an insurer
promptly and "unequivocally advised plaintiffs and their attorneys ... of its intention to
pursue its own subrogation lien .... "); see also Meyers v. Hablutzel, 603 N.E.2d 91, 94 (111.
App. Ct. 1992) (stated that where the letter is sent prior to suit being filed, the doctrine will
be precluded).

87. Baron, supranote 3, At 257 ("there is no consideration given to the windfall nature

of the subrogated recovery to the insurer, nor to whether the insured is 'made whole' or fully
compensated. It is minimal relief at best.").

88. But see, generally,Thompson, supranote 66. Thompson suggests that an attorney
should use the fund doctrine to help clients achieve a better recovery. Id. at 573. In its pure
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that the case law is inconsistent and often turns on subtle factual distinctions, it is in their interest to press the issue in every case, since many fees
will not be worth litigating over. The result is an environment in which
attorneys and insurers "split the difference," so that the insurer pays some
lesser percentage for fees on its portion, further reducing the beneficial
effect of the doctrine for the injured party.
IV.

PROPOSALS

As has been said, Illinois allows the subrogation of personal injury
claims. Because the law is quite developed on this point, it is probably too

late in the day for the courts to hold otherwise. It is not too late, however,
for the General Assembly to reevaluate the approach, and to legislatively
adopt a prohibition, at least in the context of automobile insurance, against
this sort of subrogation. Such legislation would be in keeping with the
public policy goal of protecting the health of persons within the state by
affording them opportunities to obtain relief when injured. This policy was
89
manifested in the passing of the uninsured/underinsured laws, laws which
arguably burdened insurance companies, but were necessary for the greater
public good. Similarly, the legislature should consider legislation prohibiting the sale or delivery in this state of any motor vehicle insurance policy
the insurer to any
which contains a provision purporting to subrogate
90
possess.
might
insured
its
claims
personal injury
This would be a departure from Illinois law. A more conservative approach
may be to require that the issuing or re-issuing of any policy for insurance
in this state be accompanied by an offer to sell the insured, albeit at a
somewhat higher price, insurance that does not contain provisions purporting
to subrogate the insurer to the personal injury claims of the insured. Such
application, this is the practical result. Instead of paying in attorney's fees one third the
entire amount of the recovery before distribution to the insurer, the insured only pays one
third of the portion the insured receives after such distribution. Again, consider the example
where an insurance company pays $6000 in medical bills on behalf of its own insured.
Assume the insured then hires an attorney, and recovers $12,000 from the tortfeasor. Under
the fund doctrine, the company would be reimbursed its $6000 less one third for attorney fees
(or $4000). The insured would receive the same amount. Without the common fund
doctrine, the company would recover the full $6000. The insured would have to pay all of
the fees (here $4000 or one third of $12,000) out of the insured's portion of the recovery.
The insured would be left with only $2000. Often, however, attorneys do not require that
their clients pay any fee on the portion of the recovery that goes to the insurer, whether or
not the doctrine is applied. Thus the fund doctrine becomes a tool to enrich lawyers, but
makes no practical difference to clients.
89. 215 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/143 (a), (a-2) (West 1993).

90. See COUCH CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 15 for an example of a Virginia statute that

accomplishes this task.
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a law would require that the insured be informed generally of the nature of
the provision, and have the opportunity to expressly reject such a subrogation-free policy. This would mirror the existing approach to the availability
of underinsured coverage, which must be offered, and further must be
specifically
rejected by the insured or else automatically be provided in the
91

policy.

The Illinois Supreme Court, for its part, should recognize the strong
public policy of ensuring that injured persons have every opportunity to be
made whole. Considering the Illinois precedent allowing subrogation of
personal injury claims, it is too late in the day to expect the Court to rule
to the contrary. The Court should, however, realize the limitations of the
fund doctrine toward making injured persons whole, and recognize the
disparity in the case law regarding whether Illinois is an "insured whole" or
"insurer whole" jurisdiction. The Court is in a position to resolve this
dispute, and should take advantage of the next opportunity to reject
decisions such as Strike Zone 92 and instead adopt the "insured whole"
approach adopted by Ross.93 The results would be more equitable for the
people of this state.
CONCLUSION

The current state of subrogation law in Illinois works to disadvantage
injured persons, like Billy's 94 damages may go uncompensated. In many
cases, insurers who were paid to assume the risk of loss are themselves
made whole by subrogation while their insureds are not made whole. This
is inequitable since the insurer has agreed to assume the risk of nonrecovery,
and has been paid for this. Finally, the inconsistent application of the fund
doctrine does little to help injured persons, and, in fact, chiefly benefits
attorneys. Action needs to be taken to reshape the law of this state to bring
it into conformity with the public policy goals of making injured persons
whole and empowering them to receive the benefits of their insurance
bargains.
KEITH

91.
92.
93.
94.

E. EDEUS, JR.

215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/143 (a), (a-2) (West 1993).
Strike Zone, 646 N.E.2d 310; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Ross, 262 N.E.2d 618; see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3-

